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Abstract
This thesis considers the constitutional questions surrounding the use of force by police
officers. When an officer uses force in the line of duty s/he can claim qualified immunity against
a lawsuit, as an officer is using force in his or her capacity as a government agent. At the same
time, the 4th Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
use of force is a seizure of one’s body. Thus there is an inherent constitutional tension when
officers use force – should they be protected as agents of the state or should they be punished for
violating individual rights? This thesis considers the two different “objective reasonableness”
tests that guide courts in determining qualified immunity or 4th Amendment violations.
Moreover, it argues that the “objective reasonableness” test is an appropriate test for making this
inquiry and it should not be replaced with a proportionality standard, as some have argued. It
also considers the role that officers have played in American society and why a use of force
continuum is an appropriate training tool that allows officers to carry out their duty as defenders
of peace and to stay within the legal safeguards.
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Introduction
On October 3rd, 1974, Memphis Police Officers Elton Hymon and Leslie Wright
responded to a call regarding a potential burglary in an otherwise quiet neighborhood. When they
arrived at the home of the caller, the caller informed the officers that she heard glass shattering
next door and believed someone was currently insider her neighbor’s home. The officers circled
the house looking for signs of entry. As Officer Hymon reached the back, he saw a hooded figure
escape the back door and sprint towards the adjacent lot. The night was dark and Officer Hymon
could not see the suspect clearly without aid of a flashlight. Perhaps this also explains why 15
year old Edward Garner ran directly into a six-foot high chain link fence. Officer Hymon
declared his presence with, “police, halt!” just as Garner began to scale the fence. Fearing that if
Garner made it to the other side he would evade arrest, Officer Garner, in full compliance with
Tennessee state law and training from the Memphis police department, drew his 38-caliber
handgun and shot Garner in the back of the head. Garner crumpled at the base of the fence. On
his person were $10 and an empty purse. Garner clung to life during the ambulance ride, but died
on the operating room table at a local Memphis hospital.1
Every day across the United States more than 1 million men and women strap on a bullet
proof vest, lace their boots tight, and pin a law enforcement badge to their chest. This puts the
job of law enforcement officer as one of the top 20 most common jobs in the US.2 However, the
role of police in society goes beyond just an occupation. Officers are expected to ensure peace
and enforce the rule of law. Yet, officers have come under fire in recent years for claims of
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excessive use of force. Some point back to earlier decades to demonstrate a pattern of abuse of
power by those who ostensibly are, “public servants.”
When officers abuse their power and use force in a manner that exceeds (or purportedly
exceeds) what is necessary, it is the role of the courts to detangle the mess. Courts have the
unenviable task of weighing effective law enforcement against individual freedoms. In the case
of Officer Hymon and Edward Garner the court would find itself wrestling with just this question
– how to balance police action and individual rights. As we will see, the Supreme Court
ultimately settled this question by offering an “objective reasonableness” test. This test called for
an officer’s action to be evaluated by what a reasonable officer in the same context would have
done. Some scholars find this test too deferential to officers, calling for a reevaluation of the
constitutional standard.
However, before there can be a constitutional inquiry, there must be a use of force
incident. What happens when an officer and a suspect interact can mean life or death for both
parties. It certainly will determine if an officer will be found at fault for abuse of power. Since it
is the job of officers to navigate these difficult and occasionally deadly situations, it is
appropriate to assess the training that officers receive. Though there is no one standard police
training method, many precincts, especially after the Supreme Court formulated the “objective
reasonableness” test, have adopted a use of force continuum training method. The use of force
continuum is a training module that guides officers to use force commiserate with the force used
and threat posed by the suspect in question. Some criticize this method as being too formulaic
and offer their own training methods – known as “amendment based training” or the “Just be
Reasonable” method – as alternatives.

3

Here I argue that the “objective reasonableness” test, alongside a properly formulated use
of force continuum, form an effective method for preparing officers and holding them
accountable for their actions. Officers who are trained under a continuum model will have a clear
understanding of what force is appropriate in what situation. Use of force continuum training is
not mutually exclusive with Amendment based training. Both can be used to prepare officers for
the field. The “objective reasonableness” test grants officers appropriate discretion in policing
while still permitting harsh punishment for those who overstep their bounds.
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Historical and Legal Context
Constitutional Status Quo
Let’s return to Officer Hymon and Edward Garner. Officer Hymon’s use of deadly force
was permitted by state law. Tennessee statute stated that if, “after notice of the intention to arrest
the defendant, he either flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use all the necessary means to
effect the arrest.”3 In questioning, Officer Hymon admitted that he could see Garner’s hands and
he believed Garner to be unarmed. Edward Garner’s father disagreed that the actions that led to
his son’s death should be permitted and brought a wrongful death suit against Officer Hymon
and the Memphis Police Department.
The ensuing legal battle would reach its way to the highest court in the land, where a
divided Supreme Court would ultimately hold such a statute and police training to be
unconstitutional. However, more than 30 years later, it seems that little has changed. Dontre
Hamilton, Eric Garner, John Crawford, and Michael Brown – all four were unarmed young black
Americans killed by law enforcement during a six month window in 2014; just like Edward
Garner. Clearly there is some disconnect between the Court’s ruling and the reality of use of
force by law enforcement.
Justice White, writing the majority opinion, affirmed the appellate court’s determination
that the use of force is a seizure. Moreover, it is a seizure of the highest order.4 The 4th
Amendment is clear, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”5 As deadly force is a
“seizure” that cannot be undone, the state must have an overwhelming interest that can outweigh
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the individual’s right. White looked at the Tennessee statute and its particular application to
Garner and determined that the state’s interest in preventing burglary does not outweigh Garner’s
life. Importantly, Officer Hymon had no reason to believe that Garner was a threat to himself, the
officer, or society. This is a fact that Officer Hymon readily acknowledged at the time of the
incident and later questionings.6
White went beyond this question and considered the common law tradition of the use of
force. Use of force was, at the time of the framing of the Constitution, a more socially acceptable
and widely used law enforcement tool than today. At that time statutory felonies were few and
most were capital offenses, so killing a fleeing suspect was little more than accelerating
punishment. White noted the context in which law enforcement is done today is greatly different
and our understanding of how much the common law ought to hold should change as well. At tie
time the 4th Amendment was drafted, handguns were unheard of, so it was unlikely that there
would be an instance where an officer would kill and unarmed suspect who was fleeing the scene
of a petty theft.7
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote a dissent. O’Connor pointed back to the decision in
Terry v. Ohio which noted that, “police conduct necessitates swift action predicated upon the onthe-spot observations of the officer.”8 She considered the facts of the Garner case, laying out a
brief for Officer Hymon’s actions. First, when Officer Hymon arrived on the scene the caller told
him that “they” were next door – Hymon had reason to believe that there were multiple suspects
committing the burglary. Also, though Officer Hymon testified that he saw nothing in Garner’s
right hand, Garner’s left hand was hidden from view. Finally, when Officer Hymon demanded
Garner “halt”, Garner sprang to action and attempted to climb the chain link fence. Hymon’s
6
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instinct and spur of the moment determination as an officer were to prevent the suspect from
fleeing the scene. O’Connor goes on to assert that we cannot assess Hymon’s actions with the
benefit of hindsight. An officer in the moment would understand that home invasion burglary is
an extremely serious offense because it is often accompanied by more serious crimes, such as
rape and assault. Moreover, if a suspect is not apprehended at the scene of the crime, he is almost
guaranteed to evade arrest and remain at large. Justice O’Connor explains that the Tennessee
legislature understood that to be true when they crafted the statute that permitted Hymon to shoot
Garner.9 The legislature determined that there is a compelling public interest in apprehending
suspects.
Though O’Connor’s logic did not win over the court, some of her thoughts were reflected
in the majority opinion in Graham v. Connor.10 Graham v. Connor came 4 years after Tennessee
v. Garner and is still good law today. Briefly, the facts of the case surround an interaction
between two men and the Charlotte City Police Department. One of the two men, Graham, was
suffering from an insulin withdrawal. During questioning and detention by the police he suffered
multiple injuries, including those related to his withdrawal. Graham filed suit. On appeal, the
court applied a Due Process standard to assess Graham’s claim. The Supreme Court granted cert
to rule on what standard (Due Process, Common Law, 4th Amendment Seizure, etc.) ought to be
used to assess claims of the use of excessive force by law enforcement officials. The majority
looked to O’Connor’s dissent in Garner as well as White’s majority opinion, and opined that all
claims of the use of excessive force by law enforcement officials – deadly or not – in the course
of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other "seizure" of a free citizen are properly analyzed under
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the 4th Amendment's "objective reasonableness" standard.11 This standard calls for courts to not
consider what hindsight dictates was the appropriate response, but what an ordinary officer in the
same context would have done.12 In this thesis, I argue that “objective reasonableness” is an
effective standard for assessing violations of 4th Amendment rights, and that a properly
formulated use of force continuum provides officers with appropriate guidelines on how and
when to use force. This both reflects how incidents play out in the field and respects individual
rights.

Brief History of Law Enforcement in the United States

From 1830-1850, America saw the birth of its modern police system. Centrally
controlled and operated precincts popped up along major cities in the Northeast, followed by
New Orleans, Atlanta, and finally the West Coast. Prior to this time, social order was enforced
by gangs of “watchmen” who were little more than local neighborhood watches save municipal
authority.13 However, the expansion of American cities brought about crime and disorder that
demanded a more powerful police force. Since this time, the police have operated as the
proverbial “long arm of the law”, ensuring order and peace.

11

A seizure is a government termination of movement through a means intentionally applied. A seizure in this
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This stems out of the recognition that the state (and thus agents of the state) has a certain
monopoly on violence. This idea was advanced by Max Weber in his “Politics as Vocation”.14
There Weber posits that the state is best conceived as a “human community that (successfully)
claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”15
Importantly, Weber does not assert the state is the only actor who uses violence (a suggestion
that can be easily countered by turning on the 5 o’clock news). Rather, the state is the only actor
who is recognized as having the legitimacy to use violence. This legitimacy can only be
maintained so long as the authority is recognized.
A common argument is that individuals recognize the state as having the authority to
govern the individual’s activities. The individual cedes their right to use violence freely for
security that can be provided for by the state. This security-autonomy tradeoff is a hallmark of
understanding legitimacy at the local citizen-state level as well as the international state-state
level.16 Legitimacy in our context is the right of legal authorities to exercise power, prescribe
behavior, and enforce laws.17 The recognition and justification of police power and influence
involves the belief that the police have a “just, fair and valid basis of legal authority.”18 Police
and their citizen peers are then in a constant state of balanced tension.
Problems arise when police, acting as agents of the state, abuse (or are perceived to have
abused) their power. Police misuse of force undermines the authority of the state because this is
effectively breeching the tradeoff of security for autonomy, upsetting the balanced tension.
Public trust in police is vital for successful maintenance of security. The most direct way to
14
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Ibid., 34.
16
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erode public trust is for the police to cause harm to innocent citizens. Consider the public
backlash against police in the midst of the 1960s in the midst of civil rights abuses. Or again in
the ‘90s following Rodney King, Abner Louima, and Amadou Diallo.
Certainly there are some bad actors within police departments that spark this public
outcry, but it is not fair to shoulder the blame entirely on officers. Whether warranted or not, the
American public simply disagrees with much use of force. One 1997 survey found that the
preponderance of Americans approve of the police, save in the area of use of force incidents.19
Interestingly, a follow up 1999 study found that three quarters of all Americans who were
involved in a use of force incident perceived the use of force by the officer(s) to have been
excessive.20 A 2004 study attempted to understand this perception problem by presenting citizens
with a variety of different videos on police encounters. The researchers found that study group
largely indicated they expected officers to follow jurisdictional and procedural guidelines when
approaching suspects and unruly citizens, but at the same time, the participants recognized that
there are certain unpredictable situations that call for an officer to use his or her judgment and
experience.21 Put differently, Americans want officers to behave “by the book” but also
recognize that officers should be permitted officers to use “street smarts” to enforce the law.
This is certainly an opinion that is not lost on officers, who themselves are citizens.
Indeed, recognition that there are certain quasi-extra-judicial measures that officers commonly
use is revealed in the responses of a 2000 survey. This survey sought to address how officers
viewed their role. A preponderance of officers reported that they, “believed that officers should
be permitted to use more force than the law currently permits” and they find it “acceptable to

19

Kuhns, Joseph B., Johannes Knutsson, and David H. Bayley. Police Use of Force: A Global Perspective. Santa
Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010, 6.
20
Ibid., 8.
21
Miller, Seumas, and John Blackler. Ethical Issues in Policing. Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate, 2005.
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sometimes use more force than the law permits.”22 Clearly officers do not believe the law is
flexible enough to allow them to complete their job. Unfortunately, this can manifest itself in
excessive use of force.
The problem that lies at the heart of the question is the dichotomy of excessive force and
public perception. While the public may recognize that officers are occasionally forced to use
means that break their own directives, when this happens, officers are perceived to be less
accountable and therefore less legitimate.

Restriction and Regulation of Law Enforcement in United States

The earliest restriction on the use of force by agents of the state (be that watchmen or
police) was common law. Specifically, as is true for much of early American common law
jurisprudence, English common law guided American courts in criminal justice matters. With
respect to the use of force and the common law, Blackstone writes, “Where an officer in the
execution of his office … kills a person that assaults or resists him. If an officer … attempts to
take a man charged with a felony, and is resisted, and in the endeavor to take him kills him. In all
these cases there must be an apparent necessity … otherwise, without such absolute necessity it
is not justifiable.23 The first sentence clearly relates to the common law understanding of selfdefense. The second relates to the fleeing felon rule. The final sentence noted that the use of
force must be a matter of necessity.24 This common law understanding was applied, in one form
or another, by the states until 1868. In ’68, Congress ratified the Fourteenth Amendment,

22
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adopting its due process clause. Though there may have been little procedural changes in local
law enforcement practice, the Amendment did bring the restriction of use of force incidents into
the federal jurisdiction.25
The history of regulation of police practice in the United States can be divided into three
major periods.26 The first was a lengthy period of non-regulation. During the nascent years of the
modern police force there was almost no external pressure or controls. The role of the police, as
distinct from the roving bands of watchmen, was still poorly defined.27 During this period the
police enforced public control with violence and brutality. This manifest itself in the police
response to strikes and labor movements. Officers frequently silenced protest and forced strikers
back to their work assignments. One author documents police interaction with strikers as a
“whole-sale clubbing of strikers.”28 As police violence came to be the expected norm, there was
almost no protest. Since there was no public discourse against these policing practices, officers
were free to continue. Police brutality was simply accepted as a facet of life.29 Of course, calling
these policing practices “brutal” is to impose our own sensibilities on the era.
It was not until the early years of the twentieth century that the Progressives were able to
push for some degree of reform. This led to an era of self-regulation. Precincts across the nation
were under pressure from the public. Many officers refused to wear symbols of their office when
they were not on shift for fear of retaliatory attacks.30 In response to pressure from Progressives,
many police chiefs adopted a policy of “professionalism.” A major aspect of this internal
policing reform came from strengthening departmental policies on training and use of force.
25

More clearly established 3 years later with the 1871 passage of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
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There were new education requirements for officers in positions of leadership within the
department. The advent of new technology such as the police car, radio, and telephone enabled
departments to more closely supervise and regulate officers.31 This era of self-regulation came to
a close during the civil unrest of the ‘60s. Extreme and well documented police brutality
demonstrated that even progressive minded, well intentioned police chiefs were unable to control
their officers. At the same time, crime rates exploded, leading to a situation where public trust in
officers fell to a nadir.
This heralded in the era of external regulation. The public along with Congress and the
Judiciary scrutinized and restricted police activities. In particular the Courts found success in
restraining and reforming police activity.

Legal Restrictions on the Use of Force by Officers

Though I had noted that prior to the period of external regulation police officers were free
to operate without outside pressure than today, officers have always been bound by federal, state
and local law. Chief among statutes that regulate the actions of officer is 42 U.S.C. § 1983.32
This federal statute, established in the 1871, follows and closely relates to the Fourteenth
Amendment. 42 U.S.C § 1983 (“Section 1983”) declares that, pursuant to the power of Congress

Greene, Jack and Geoffrey, Alpert P. “Police Overview.” Violence in America: An Encyclopedia (531-9) New
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons (1999), 535.
32
Which reads, “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in
such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to
the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.”
31
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to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, “every person” may seek damages against any agent of
the state who deprives a person of their Fourteenth Amendment rights. 33 Section 1983 has
played a very important role in shaping police practices.
Prior to Garner, where the Court more clearly shifted the question of use of force into the
arena of the 4th Amendment, questions of use of force were determined by Fourteenth
Amendment due process requirements, as codified in Section 1983. In, Rochin v. California34,
the Supreme Court considered the admissibility of evidence that was obtained by acts that “shock
the conscience”.35 The court unanimously opined that police conduct that violates this 14th
Amendment balancing test is unconstitutional. Though this opinion most directly considered due
process as it relates to evidence, the decision did formally restrict the actions that police could
take. This due process standard ruled informally for twenty years until Johnson v. Glick.36 There
the Court considered a pretrial detainee’s right to be free from excessive force from a
correctional officer under Section 1983 and the 14th Amendment. The Court held that under the
precedent of Rochin, “quite apart from any specific amendment of the Bill of Rights, application
of undue force by law enforcement officer deprives the suspect of liberty without due process of
law.”37 Importantly, the court rejected the application of 8th Amendment protection against cruel
and unusual punishment. They noted that this only applies to those who have been convicted and

33
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36
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Ibid., 1032.
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sentenced, not pretrial detainees.38 The court here determined that because at that time no
specific amendment was thought to apply protection to state and local pretrial detainees,
protection must necessarily come from the 14th Amendment. Therefore, in Rochin the precedent
was set that a person may prove an excessive force claim under the 14th Amendment, so long as
they demonstrate that the conduct “shocks the conscience.”39 The Second Circuit court in Glick
even offered a four part test to determine if a use of force incident rises to the Rochin standard.
Judge Friendly wrote, “In determining whether the constitutional line has been crossed, a court
must look to such factors as the need for application of force, the relationship between the need
and the amount of force that was used, the extent of injury inflicted, and whether force was
applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously or sadistically for
the very purpose of causing harm.”4041
Of course, this only served as an indirect control against officers. The first direct external
control that came from the court was in Mapp v. Ohio. 42 This 1961 case concerning evidentiary
standards established that the federal exclusionary rule also applies to the states. The
exclusionary rule maintains that evidence collected or analyzed in violation of the defendant's
constitutional rights is normally inadmissible for a criminal prosecution in a court of law. This
was the first major external control placed on state and local police departments in regard to the
use of force. This was truly the watershed moment that led to a series of legal and constitutional
challenges that culminated in Garner and Graham.

38
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The decisions in Garner and Graham rest on a number of constitutionally established
definitions. One of the most important is the definition of seizure, as it relates to the seizure of a
person. The Court has defined the seizure of a person as, “a governmental termination of
freedom of movement through a means intentionally applied.”43 This definition has several
important components when considering use of force incidents. “Governmental action” should
be understood as the actions taken by officers on the scene, as officers are agents of the state.
“Intentional termination of freedom of movement” ties to Garner, where the Court established
that “whenever an officer restrains the freedom of a person to walk away, he has seized that
person.”44 Interestingly and importantly, this standard does not mean that anytime force is used
an officer has committed a seizure – a seizure only occurs if a person is actually restrained from
leaving. The use of force alone is not a seizure. “Intended person” has a checkered constitutional
history. On one hand we have a case where an innocent bystander, a child, was shot and killed.45
This is not a seizure since the boy was not the intended person. On the other hand, in Keller v.
Frink it was determined that a seizure had occurred when a game warden shot at an occupied
and fleeing vehicle because he wanted to “mark” the vehicle for later identification.46 There are
certainly differences in the two cases, but we must understand that “means intentionally applied”
does not only concern what the officer intended to do. We must also consider the outcome of the
officer’s actions (else, the game warden would not have committed a seizure, since he asserts
that he did not intend to shoot the passenger). “Means intentionally applied” seems to have a
close relationship with intended person and may help alleviates some of the obfuscation the
intended person definition. Cameron v. City of Pontiac established that “intended means” are
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those means that actually incapacitated and “seized” the person, used either directly or indirectly
by an officer with the purpose of incapacitation.47 It seems that the difference in the boy and the
game warden are that the game warden intended to incapacitate the suspect’s vehicle. He meant
to impede the suspect’s ability to flee. As a foreseeable consequence of his action, the suspect
was shot. In the case of the boy, the boy was neither the direct or indirect intended target, nor
were the means applied against him. His death was regrettable but unintentional collateral
damage.
Another important definition is that of deadly force. Deadly force was defined in Miller v.
Clark County to be “force [that] presents more than a remote possibility of death in the
circumstance under which it was used… mere possibilities and capabilities do not add up to
reasonable probability.”48 This combined with the Court’s justification for the use of deadly
force when there is probable cause to believe that there is an imminent threat of serious physical
harm,49 means that the threat of serious physical harm justifies the use of force that creates a
significant risk of death.50 This definition of deadly force ties nicely to the use of force
continuum model. A continuum model instructs officers to meet resistance with an equivalent
level of force. If and only if a suspect resists with the threat of deadly force is an officer
permitted to respond with deadly force. The use of force continuum meets the criteria established
by the court for the use of deadly force. More importantly, it guides the court in cases where
deadly force was used. Was the force in response to an equal threat, thus compatible with the
continuum? Or did the officer reject his/her training and escalate? Either way, the Court will
have an easier time applying and justifying its standards.
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Certainly the most important definition for our argument is objective reasonableness.
While this standard will be assessed later, it is important that we address how the Court
understands objective reasonableness. Graham (citing Bell v. Wolfish) notes that this standard is
“not capable of precise definition or mechanical application.” Rather this standard was crafted to
give officers a certain flexibility. This reflects a proper understanding of how seizure works in
other 4th Amendment applications. The court notes, “[the 4th Amendment] is not violated by an
arrest based on probable cause, even though the wrong person is arrested… not by the mistaken
execution of valid search warrant on the wrong premises… with respect to a claim of excessive
force the same standard of reasonableness at the moment applies.”51 The reasonableness standard
does not offer any sort of bright line rule to govern officer-suspect interactions. The standard
does not even suggest a minimum or maximum standard; it simply offers a binary of whether the
action of the officer would be judged to be reasonable by a reasonable officer in the same
situation. Consider US v. Martinez-Fuente, where the officers used a more invasive means of
search than was necessary – the Court maintained that the more invasive means were still
reasonable under the 4th amendment seizure.52 Similarly, the objective reasonableness standard
which governs seizures of the person simply calls for reasonableness, not minimum invasiveness.

Qualified Immunity

Complicating the literature surrounding objective reasonableness as it relates to use of
force is the objective reasonableness test in the doctrine of qualified immunity. The doctrine of
qualified immunity was developed as a defense to the passage of U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section
51
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1983”). Under U.S.C § 1983, state and local officers can be sued for actions taken that deprived
a private citizen of his or her individual rights. 53 Similarly, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics54 extends this liability so that to federal agents can be
held accountable for their actions. Qualified Immunity is a defense that precludes individuals
from seeking damages against a government agent unless that agent has violated “clearly
established” constitutional rights. In most cases concerning use of force, law enforcement
officials will evoke qualified immunity in the hope of obtaining a summary judgment and not
have their actions stand the scrutiny of trial. When a police officer is sued, generally, the plaintiff
must prove that not only did the officer violate his or her rights, but also that these rights was
clearly established at the time of the offense or else qualified immunity may be successfully
invoked.
Section 1983 has an interesting legislative history. Following the Civil War was a period
of violence committed against the now emancipated black Americans at the hands of hate
organizations. The most widely known of these groups, the Ku Klux Klan, acted with relative
impunity from local authorities.55 The 42nd Congress believed that if left unchecked, the Klan
would only continue the violence. States were not to be trusted. Federal relief might be the only
remedy that black Americans could expect. Congress responded with what was colloquially

Recall that Section 1983 reads, “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
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known as the “Ku Klux Klan Act”56, an Act with the express purpose of rebalancing the scales of
justice against state governments. The Ku Klux Klan Act is most appropriately understood, then,
to be an Act that unabashedly defends individual civil rights. Though this act did not pass whole
cloth, sections were enacted – namely what became codified as 42 U.S.C (s) 1983.57 In this way
private citizens in the Reconstruction South could hold state and municipal officials accountable
to the law. This Act was not intended to create a substantive right. Rather, it offered a procedural
mechanism for defending Constitutional Rights. Interestingly, this legislative history seemed to
have had little impact in the application of Section 1983 claims less than one-hundred years later.
The earliest modern tests of Section 1983’s qualified immunity provisions came in 1975
with Wood v. Strickland58. In a case involving the authority of school officials, the Court defined
the circumstances in which Section 1983 qualified immunity would not be applicable. The
majority opined that qualified immunity should not be granted in instances where an agent,
“knew or reasonably should have known that the action he [or she] took within his [or her]
sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional right of the plaintiff, or if he [or
she] took the action with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or
other injury”59 This decision seemed to imply that an agent of the state could assume qualified
immunity would be granted unless he or she acted with malicious intent or recognized his or her
actions to be unlawful. The Court effectively implemented a “good faith” test of qualified
immunity.60 This certainly moved away from the original intent of the law as drafted by the 42nd
Congress, and it failed to provide what little protection that it still suggested. In reality, several
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courts were unwilling to grant a qualified immunity judgment without a trial – they believed this
implicit “good faith” was too subjective.61 62
The question of qualified immunity and good faith actions of government officers came
to a head in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.63 The problem with the good faith standard, as illustrated
above, is that the inherent subjective elements of making a good faith determination undermine
the purpose of the doctrine – to shield officers from frivolous suit. Qualified Immunity
recognizes that individuals should be able to seek redress for constitutional rights violations.
These violations are particularly egregious when one considers that they were caused by
government agents. The Court reasons this, noting, “[in] situations of abuse of office, an action
for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees”. 64
At the same time, there is a wide societal interest in ensuring that government is both efficient
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and effective. The Harlow Court weighed these interests and overwhelmingly sided with the
government. Rather than uphold the Wood standard, which stated when qualified immunity
should not be granted, Harlow addressed when it should be applied. According to the Court,
qualified immunity should be granted unless “[the] defendant official knew or reasonably should
have known that the [official] action he took ... would violate the [plaintiff's] constitutional rights
... or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional
rights or other injury.”65 This completely removed the subjective inquiry into what a reasonable
agent would have known. Instead, courts simply had to determine what this particular agent
reasonably should have known.66 This clearly enunciated the second objective reasonableness
standard that governs use of force incidents – the objective reasonableness qualified immunity
test.
The problem with the Harlow decision is that not all constitutional rights are so clearly
established to meet the rigor of the totally objective Harlow standard. The solution to this came
in Anderson v. Creighton.67 Here the court recognized that the Harlow test was not being applied
as directed by the court. Rather than considering what the officer thought, courts had balanced
government interests against individual rights by “generally providing government officials
performing discretionary functions with a qualified immunity, shielding them from civil damages
liability as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights
they are alleged to have violated.”68 The focus of the court had been on the action and not the
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subjective knowledge of the officer. Recognizing this, the court formalized this test and noted
that in order to determine qualified immunity; the objective reasonableness assessment must
include an “examination of the information possessed by the officials”. Though this certainly
turned on Harlow by requiring a more intensive fact-finding test, the court maintained that this
was imperative to protect officers who took action that they mistakenly (but objectively
reasonably) believed to be lawful.69 70

From 1982-1989, the Court wrestled with developing two distinct and interrelated
objective reasonableness standards.71 In technical terms there are fundamental ideological
differences that were discussed above. Qualified Immunity Objective Reasonableness calls for an
inquiry into what an officer reasonably should have known, 4th Amendment Objective
Reasonableness calls for an inquiry into what a reasonable officer would have done. That said, it
is understandably likely that both inquiries be found in the same case. In fact, Graham cited
Anderson, noting that the degree of force used may be relevant in assessing qualified immunity
claims.72 Unfortunately, these two inquiries are often combined into one assessment.73
In Saucier v. Katz74 the Court considered what is an admittedly weak excessive force
claim.75 Saucier claimed qualified immunity as a defense. The Ninth Circuit denied the
summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, insisting that the inquiry into objective
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reasonableness of Saucier’s actions under the 4th Amendment and objective reasonableness of his
understanding of the law must be separate and distinct. The Court stated,
If an officer reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that a suspect was likely to fight
back, for instance, the officer would be justified in using more force than in fact
was needed…. The concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that
reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular police
conduct. It is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant
legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer
confronts. An officer might correctly perceive all of the relevant facts but have a
mistaken understanding as to whether a particular amount of force is legal in
those circumstances. If the officer‘s mistake as to what the law allows is
reasonable, however, the officer is entitled to the immunity defense.76
Certainly there is a technical distinction between these two inquiries—judging what the
facts of a situation are and judging what the law permits in such situations. However, the
implication of this distinction is baffling. The Court effectively ruled that there are instances
where, when considering all the evidence of what a reasonable office would believe, an officer
could conduct him/herself unreasonably, but still be “let off” by qualified immunity if s/he
reasonably believed in mistaken facts. When applied to Saucier, to be sure, the distinction makes
sense. Katz’s claim was frivolous and it makes sense to apply summary judgment of qualified
immunity. Even the use of deadly force that was proven to be an objectively unreasonable action
can still be protected by qualified immunity. The status quo necessitates that there have been
some appreciably similar fact pattern already tried in order to definitively prevent summary
judgment.
76
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Law Enforcement
Citizen-Officer Interaction
Now that we have established a theoretical framework that undergirds the citizen-officer
relationship, it is appropriate to discuss how citizen-officer interactions actually play out. The
reality is that in the vast majority of interactions between officers and citizens, officers do not
use force. Geoffrey Alpert and Roger Dunham considered data released from the Miami-Dade
Sherriff’s office.77 The researchers were particularly interested in developing a model or way of
understanding typical police-suspect interactions. Alpert and Dunham posit that the general
population (and some earlier researchers) fundamentally misunderstood police-suspect
interaction. They think of the use of force by police or the active resistance of an officer as a
discreet instance within the larger context of the specific police-suspect interaction. This
understanding does not consider that the action of one party is directly in response to the action
of the other party.78 The suggestion seems obvious, but the literature is bereft of studies that
consider the systematic escalation of force by one party in response to the actions of the other
party.
This idea was first advanced by Richard Sykes and Richard Brent in their seminal work
on officer-suspect interactions considering the Miami-Dade data.79 These researchers argued
that, “police civilian interaction consists of a series of dyadic interactions occurring within a
larger process of dyad formation and dissolution.”80 In 2002, researcher William Terrill built on
this dyadic argument by reviewing the Miami-Dade data. He writes, “Applying force at the
77
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outset is not assurance that additional force will not be used. It may be that the initial police force
prompted the suspect to resist, thereby requiring additional force on the officer’s part. It may also
be the case that officers simply continued to use force in an attempt to maintain control of the
situation. Nonetheless, the findings indicate that the use of some degree of force at the outset
eventually results in force being used again.”81
The following year Alpert and Dunham considered how this dyadic escalation of force
can be modeled.82 Below are two tables they produced. Consider Appendix “Table 1.” This table
considers the actions that the suspect takes in response to police presence. A preponderance of
the time the suspect’s first response is non-violent. Suspects cooperated in 54% of interactions
and issued verbal non-compliance in 23% of cases. This shifts if the interaction proceeds to a
second iteration of action. In the second iteration non-resistant cooperation plummets to only
10% while defensive resistance and active resistance rise to 36% and 18% respectively.
Aggression and non-compliance rises in every subsequent interaction and plateaus around the 5th
iteration.83
Now let’s consider Appendix “Table 2.” This table reports the actions of the officer in
each iteration of officer-suspect interaction. Overwhelmingly, the first action that the officer
takes is a verbal directive. The second iteration tends to see officers issue a strong verbal order
and demand for compliance. Further, this second iteration is the first time we see appreciable
uses of violent force in the form of defensive combat. For interactions that continue to a third
iteration of action, the probability of use of violent force by the officer increases. From this work
we can conclude that most officer-suspect interactions in this dataset begin with a verbal
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“negotiation” phase. In this phase officers issue directives to the suspect who often either
complies or issues verbal non-compliance. If the suspect does not comply, the interaction is
brought into a second iteration where the officer issues a strong verbal order. This often signals
the break-down of the possibility of successful negotiation and the beginning of a phase of low
level resistance. This resistance will either end when the suspect complies or flees the scene; the
interaction enters the final phase. This phase is characterized by heightened use of force. Officers
may use intermediate weapons.
While I do not suggest this table provides conclusive evidence how officers across the
states behave in officer-suspect interactions, the data from the model likely provide a good
foundation for approaching discussion. Importantly, officers do not come to interactions
weapons drawn, suspects comply more often than they escalate, and deadly force is rarely used.84
In fact, only 1.5% of all officer-citizen interactions result in the officer using any degree of force
above verbal directives.85

Use of Force Continuum

Indeed it seems that these levels of officer-suspect interaction were taken into
consideration when developing use of force continuum models. Each precinct establishes its own
training models and organizational policies. This creates a situation where, nationally, there is no
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one use of force continuum. There are hundreds. However, the vast majority of continuum
models contain similar levels. A meta-analysis of continuum models used during the ‘90s found
that most continuum models begin, at their lowest tier or section, with mere officer presence. At
this lower end of the continuum, just above officer presence is verbal commands. This parallels
the findings of Alpert and Dunham that most officers being their interaction with the public
through verbal directives. Following this are weaponless tactics including grapples and holds
designed to able the officer to control the suspect. Towards the upper end of the continuum are
chemical agents and impact weapons. Finally, deadly force is the top tier of force usage.86
These continuum models often fall in one of two categories – linear models or circular
models.87 The linear model (an example of which is illustrated in Appendix “Figure A”) directs
an officer to match the suspect’s level of resistance. Equally important, the officer is instructed to
deescalate as the suspect becomes more compliant / less resistant. Use of force escalates in the
above described pattern through presence, verbal commands, weaponless control techniques,
chemical and impact weapons, to deadly force. The circular model (an example of which is
illustrated in Appendix “Figure B”) positions the officer at the center of the circle. Depending on
the totality of circumstance, the officer is directed to follow the appropriate “spoke.” This model
does not differ from the linear model in suggesting equal or slightly greater force in response to
the degree of resistance, but it does eschew some of the complaints about the efficacy and
applicability of the linear model.88 Alpert and Dunham conclude that based on their analysis of
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the data and the response of the officer to the resistance of the suspect, continuum models are
largely followed by officers.89
Opponents of use of force continuum training models raise a number of challenges. One
major criticism of the continuum is that by their nature, continua are easily misinterpreted. Use
of force continua in particular are often taught with visual representations of stair step, ladders,
on an upward sloping X-Y graph, skyward arrows, barometers, among others.90 Even if use of
force continua ostensibly teach escalation and de-escalation, these visual representations only
trend in one direction – towards the application of more and more force. That is only a problem
with the method of teaching the continuum, not the continuum itself. Moreover, more modern
continuum models do not employ those types of linear progressions, but rather favor a situational
approach, more appropriately taught with a circular or wheel model. Regardless, these problems
can be overcome simply by changing the graphic that is used to teach the use of force
continuum.91
Another challenge to the use of force continuum is that it can shift the inquiry away from
that of objective reasonableness to just what is prescribed by the continuum. Michael Ciminelli
uses Glenn v. Washington County92 to illustrate this point. In that case officers responded to a
911 call from a family requesting assistance to subdue their emotionally disturbed son.93 The
mother informed the 911 operator that she believed her son to be suicidal, having stated he “is
not leaving till the cops kill him … there are hunting rifles in the house [but] he can’t get to [the
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rifles].”94 When officers arrived on scene the son left the house and stood in the driveway facing
the officers. The officers attempted to reason with the son and issued verbal directives to no
avail. At this point the officers decided to fire several non-lethal beanbag rounds at the son to
incapacitate him and command his compliance.95 The son responded by rushing back to the
house, at which points officers feared he would harm his family and they opted to open fire,
killing the son.96 Charges of excessive force were brought against the officers. Initially the
charges were resolved with successful Section 1983 summary judgment in favor of the officers.
The appellate court reversed the decision and remanded the trial to the district level, noting that
the officer’s decision to fire beanbag rounds is what provoked the son to return to the home. This
action may have constituted excessive action. Ciminelli notes that the court focused on the use of
force continuum. The court observed that, “Washington County’s use of force continuum
identifies five levels of resistance, ranging from least to most resistant: verbal, static, active,
ominous and lethal. Applying Washington County’s definitions to the facts viewed in the light
most favorable to Glenn, [the son’s actions] falls under the “static” resistance category, where
the suspect “refuses to comply with commands . . . [and] has a weapon but does not threaten to
use it.”97 According to Washington County guidelines, officers can employ various types of
force in response to static resistance, including takedown methods, electrical stun devices and
pepper spray. Use of less-than-lethal munitions, however, is unauthorized unless a suspect
exhibits “ominous” or “active” resistance, which entails “pulling away from a deputy’s grasp,
attempting to escape, resisting or countering physical control,” or “demonstrating the willingness
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to engage in combat by verbal challenges, threats, aggressive behavior, or assault.”98
Accordingly, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the defendants’
own guidelines would characterize [the son’s] conduct as less than active resistance, not
warranting use of a beanbag [round].”99 The problem with this reasoning, according to Ciminelli,
is that it totally eschews an inquiry into the reasonableness of the officers’ actions.100 The
analysis seemed to hinge on the, “arbitrary placement of the subject’s actions and the force used
on the agency’s continuum, rather than an analysis of the totality of the circumstances.”101
Ciminelli’s challenge is warranted. Reconsider the facts of the case. Should the officers
have fired their weapons, killing the son? Let’s recall that the 4th Amendment only allows for this
seizure of the highest degree when a suspect poses a grave threat to society. The court in Glenn
seems to think that the officer erred when they fired their beanbags, provoking the son to flee to
the house. Effectively, the officers created a situation where they then had to use lethal force
against the son. Less lethal incapacitative options existed at the time the beanbags were fired.
Officers might have used a TASER or pepper spray, at which point the son could have been
restrained. Ciminelli challenges the court here – simply looking at the continuum and not the
totality of the circumstance ignores the clear directive from the Supreme Court.102 The officers
here may not have believed they could come within range to use a TASER or pepper spray. Or,
that using those methods would not be sufficient to eliminate the threat. Mechanical application
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of the use of force continuum of Washington County just isn’t reasonable. Ciminelli seems to
contend that the officers acted appropriately – that the totality of circumstances dictated the
firing of a beanbag round. But regardless of the outcome of the trial, the simple fact that the court
addressed the use of force continuum while discussing reasonableness is to Ciminelli a problem.
If the court had reached a verdict based solely on the “arbitrary placement of the subject’s
actions … on the agency’s continuum”103
I would be inclined to agree there is a significant problem. Rather, this is an appellate
court reversing the summary judgment and application of qualified immunity. The court
appropriately notes that the actions the officers took exceeded their training. This does not mean
that there was an excessive use of force, but it does raise suspicion. It is appropriate, then, to
launch a formal inquiry into the reasonableness of the officers’ actions through trial. At trial the
officers must be able to articulate their thought process and justify, legally, the actions that were
taken. Herein lies a strength of the use of force continuum. When juries are instructed that use of
force incidents should be resolved by an objective reasonableness standard, they are simply told
that the objective reasonableness standard means they must consider what any reasonable officer
would have thought/acted on in the same context.104 A use of force continuum allows an officer
to explain to the lay juror how officers are taught to behave in the field in a succinct, and often
visual, way. Thus the continuum can serve officers and jurors by creating some common ground,
rather than leaving jurors to decide what “reasonable” in the context of law enforcement
means.105 106
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While discussing Glenn, Ciminelli further notes that the court addressed the fact the son
was emotionally disturbed. In justifying their decision, the court writes that this fact was “a
factor to which the officers should have assigned greater weight”107 Ciminelli goes on to argue
that a use of force continuum model does not give officers proper discretion to handle cases
where officers must interact with the mentally ill. This is an especially pertinent observation
when one considers that police interactions with the mentally ill vastly outweigh their
distribution in the general population.108
On its face, this is a compelling argument for a weakness of the use of force continuum.
The continuum dictates officers behave a certain way in response to a suspect’s actions. The
problem is that the behavior of some mentally ill may not reasonably warrant the response
suggested by the continuum.109 In order to tackle this issue I suggest we return to the facts in
Glenn and consider a hypothetical. In case A we have the same fact pattern as in Glenn, but we
know that the son is mentally disturbed. In case B let’s suppose that rather than the son, the
suspect was a guest in the family home who turned violent over some argument (a distinction I
make so that it is clear that there is some reason for him issuing the threats). In both A and B we
have a suspect outside a family home engaging the police, holding a knife. The suspect in both
cases has issued threats but is not currently in a position to carry them out. Should the officers
behave differently in cases A and B?
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Consider a different hypothetical. In this case an officer responds to a call about an
individual causing a disturbance in a side street. The officer arrives on scene and sees a suspect
yelling and swinging a broken bottle. Does it make a difference if the individual is mentally
disturbed? It is true that mental illness could manifest itself in aggressive action.110 It also may
be true that a mentally ill individual who behaves aggressively, like the son, could issue threats
that he or she does not mean to act on, but this is not something that an officer cannot be
expected to know. The use of force continuum guides an officer to respond to a suspect’s
demonstrated verbal and physical aggression. In both this hypothetical and the above
hypotheticals of reconsidering Glenn, officers likely cannot make any significant difference in
their action, regardless of their knowledge of the suspect’s mental state. The role of the officer in
the field during a use of force incident is to protect society and enforce the law. Mandating that
an office abandon his/her training when the suspect is mentally ill heightens the risk that one or
both parties can be injured. Moreover, treating the suspects the same does not violate their 4th
Amendment right. The 4th Amendment objective reasonableness inquiry is not one that considers
the intent of the “victim” of use of force seizures. Rather, it is one that considers what the actor, a
reasonable officer, would think.
This is not to say that the courts should treat the mentally ill the same as other offenders.
Courts are obliged to consider what is best for society and the individual when sentencing.
Courts are uniquely situated to issue lenient punishment or suggest treatment. Officers do not
have the luxury of leniency. The mentally ill certainly pose a unique challenge for officers and
society writ large. But, when confronted by a threatening or uncooperative individual, a properly
structured use of force continuum should dictate the reasonable officer’s conduct.
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Amendment Based Training and JBR

In response to the above criticisms and others, several police departments have moved
away from using a use of force continuum training model. Two major (often interlinked) models
are the Just Be Reasonable (“JBR”) model and Amendment Based Training. Amendment Based
Training considers the legal developments in Garner and Graham. Proponents note that the
focus of these cases is on the “totality of circumstances” and the “objective reasonableness” of
the officers’ actions. The reasoning, then, is that the focus of police training should not be on
forcing officers to respond mechanically to a suspect’s actions, but to act reasonably in the field
in regards to the controlling Court decisions. In teaching Tennessee v. Garner, officers are given
a series of considerations to weigh when determining the appropriate level of force.111 The
Garner court stated, “if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause
to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of
serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where
feasible, some warning has been given.”112 This is broken down into three components: probable
cause, the use of deadly force to prevent escape, and the issuance of a warning. Officers are
taught that if they cannot articulate probable cause, they should never consider advancing to the
use of deadly force. Moreover, before they use deadly force they should attempt to issue a
warning if it is feasible and appropriate. It is feasible if “An officer first should consider whether
the suspect is aware that the police are trying to apprehend him, such that he has knowledge that
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he should stop.”113 It is appropriate if “an officer reasonably believes, based on the suspect’s
prior conduct, that such a warning would not cause the suspect to surrender, but rather would
provoke the suspect to engage in violent and life-threatening behavior, or to increase his or her
efforts to flee, then a warning is not feasible.”114
When teaching Graham v. Connor, trainers turn to the court’s insistence that, “the
severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight [should be weighed].”115 Again, this is broken into three teaching considerations: threat
assessment, determination of active resistance, and severity of the crime. These six teaching tools
become the corner stone of amendment based training.116 Officers are trained in both traditional
classroom setting as well as individual scenario assessment on how to apply these considerations
in the field.
What is important to note is that this amendment based training is not mutually exclusive
with the use of force continuum. John Klein writes,
“The majority of recruits know police force only through the false heroes of
television shows and motion pictures. For those recruits, perhaps a force
continuum will suffice in the kindergarten stage of police training, but it must be
quickly supplanted as they learn law, conflict resolution skills, arrest control
techniques and defensive tactics. A modern use of force training curriculum must
reach far beyond traditional classroom lectures with visual models of stair steps,
continua and wheels. We expect officers to be advanced beyond a
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stimulus/response force decision making model by the time that they hit the
streets. Then we demand an even higher level of discernment, discretion and
sophistication in force decisions from our veteran officers. A trainer must ask at
what point the rudimentary teaching tool of the continuum [loses] all
relevance”117
Klein goes on to posit that the continuum does not appropriately allow officers to escalate
and de-escalate as the officer-suspect interaction naturally evolves.118 Klein and other
Amendment based training advocates evidence this claim by considering the science behind
decision making processes. They rely on the research of Colonel John Boyd and his “Boyd
Loop” or “Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act” process.119 Boyd contends that when faced with a
threatening situation the brain phases through a dynamic, sequential, decision making process.
The steps, Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (“OODA”) are defined in the following manner.
The first step is observation, where the individual becomes aware of his or her surroundings. In
police and military circles, one’s ability to make these observations is often called “situational
awareness”120 The second step is orientation. In this phase the individual synthesizes the facts
gathered during the observation period with other knowledge and a mental image of the full
situation is formed. The third phase is the decision making phase, where officers determine what
action to take and move quickly to the final phase – action. The first two steps, observe and
orient, occur as quickly as human reaction time. However, in high stress life threatening
situations officers may not be able to easily able to transition to the decision and action phase.
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This has been documented time and time again in both law enforcement and military – officers
and soldiers appear to be frozen, stuck, and totally indecisive.121
Boyd argues that during times of high stress, individuals are not able to readily respond to
novel situations. They are stuck in a loop, “Boyd’s loop” of observation and orientation.122 This
is because in these split second decision making processes, the brain does not attempt to create a
plan of action, rather, it looks for a similar pattern that it has already been exposed to and applies
that pattern.123 Therefore, the purpose of training, especially for police officers, should be to
expose officers to as many novel, high pressure, situations as possible.124
This is a cornerstone of amendment based training – realistic training simulations.
Significant research supports the notion that police officers are better able to make decisions, and
make better decisions, when they have been trained with these scenarios.125 What amendment
based training does is debrief officer after every scenario – ensuring that they are able to
articulate the legal reasonableness of their actions based on the aforementioned six training
principles.126 With this new method, some claim that the use of force continuum model is
outdated. The continuum delays the decision making because the officer would need to “walk
up” the various levels. Further, this type of decision making is counterintuitive since our brains
are not wired to make that kind of decision, at least not under the circumstances that officers face
daily.
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What this argument fails to recognize is that the continuum allows officers to enter at the
level that that is appropriate.127 An officer will respond to a pattern of aggression that was
already presented in continuum training. Certainly, a continuums should not be the sole
governing policy, but it is an effective training tool, especially for new recruits. It is also useful
for veterans as they can incorporate new “patterns” into the continuum. The real problem with
this kind of argument against the force continuum is that it is not an argument against the
continuum at all – it is an argument for better police training. As discussed, amendment based
training is first a recognition that officers must behave reasonably (including considerations of
the context and threat that faces them), and second, a training method that gives officers the
experience necessary so that they might not freeze up in the field. One could argue that this is
little more than unstructured continuum training with scenario testing. The use of force
continuum is not mutually exclusive with amendment based training, and officers will only stand
to benefit. To argue against teaching a continuum is to argue against giving recruits an incredibly
valuable tool in pattern recognition.
In precincts that employ a continuum standard, officers are taught that the use of force
must be reasonable in that totality of circumstances. More specifically, the totality of
circumstance is assessed as it relates to some use of force continuum model (be that model a
ladder, circle, pyramid, etc.) Here officers are guided by general categories of action to take in
response to the totality of circumstances unfolding before them. However, in a precinct that uses
a JBR standard, officers learn more generally how to make a decision to use force and what
factors should guide that decision making process. Similar to the Amendment based training,
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officer in JBR precincts are taught general considerations that should be assessed when taking
action.
Consider, however, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, which went from a
continuum standard to a JBR standard in 2009.128 There the standard “Response to Resistance
Matrix (a force continuum) was substituted by a series of force guidelines. The guidelines simply
set boundaries that officers should not breech, but offer no guidance as to how officers ought to
act. Inherently, the JBR standard gives officers more flexibility and discretion. The problem with
JBR training is that this policy fails when there is a bad actor. Regardless of the department or
training method, there may be a bad actor in the police department. When a bad actor is in a
department that trains officers using a continuum model, there is a clear concrete guideline to
reference. JBR seems to open precincts to suit under section 1983 more readily. However, the
problem lies not just with bad actors. Officers who make good faith attempt to follow the law
and ensure peace may open themselves to punishment in JBR precincts. Without clear training
guidelines, officers are at mercy of the jurors who may not understand the intricacies of police
work. The continuum serves both the public by holding officers accountable, but also officers.
JBR advocates seem to believe that decision making guidelines proposed by continuum
standards delay the decision making process. In a profession that is rife with life or death
situations where split second decision making is the only luxury provided these officers, it is
foolish if not dangerous to mandate that officers should have to go through mental gymnastics.129
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This could not be farther from the truth. There is no reason to believe that there is some linear
relationship between the level of structure of guidance in decision making and the speed which a
decision is made in the field. This can be better understood if we accept that use of force
continuum do not require officers begin at the lowest level of force and work their way up. This
is a false dilemma that many opponents of continuum read in. Officers in continuum precincts
are trained to assess the situation in the moment (just as officers in JBR precincts) and then guide
their action by the appropriate level within the continuum. They do not need to “climb the
ladder” as some suggest.130
This understanding further supports use of force continuum advocacy. Proponents of JBR
may suggest that the Court’s insistence on not using minimal standards is what makes JBR
superior to continuum.131 The continuum, they argue, requires the officer to use the minimum of
force and slowly climb up a ladder, or flow around some circle, until appropriate force is used.
This is foolish considering the nature of officer-suspect interactions. As long as an officer is
reasonable (the Court’s own standard), then the objective reasonableness standard is met. The
problem with this line of argument is that it does not understand that officers using a continuum
model will enter the continuum at whatever point is necessary given the totality of
circumstances. Just as an officer in JBR will assess the threat posed by the suspect and respond
accordingly, an officer using the continuum will assess the threat and then apply this to the
continuum. Neither JBR nor continuum has an obvious advantage, but neither is inferior in this
regard.
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Objective Reasonableness
Qua Objective Reasonableness
In 1992, the Sixth Circuit reassessed the Objective Reasonableness standard and offered
an interpretation that has been cited by several lower courts and other Circuits since. In a case
that contained elements of both Tennessee v. Garner and Graham v. Connor, the court
concluded, “we must avoid substitution of our personal notions of proper police procedure for
the instantaneous decisions of the office at the scene. We must never allow the theoretical,
sanitized world of our imagination to replace the dangerous and complex world that policemen
face every day. What constitutes reasonable actions may seem quite different to someone facing
a possible assailant than to someone analyzing the question at the leisure of time.”132
The same year that the court laid out the Objective Reasonableness standard in Graham,
they issued a ruling on police training. The case City of Canton v. Harris considered whether
municipalities could be held liable for failure to train officers.133 A woman who suffered
emotional and physical trauma as a result of her arrest sought to hold the City of Canton liable
under Section 1983. The Court found that a municipality may be held liable under Section 1983
only in certain limited circumstances when there were constitutional violations that resulted from
a failure to train employees. In regard to police officers specifically, the circumstances in which
the municipality may be held accountable for failure to train is limited to situations where
“failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police
come into contact.”134
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This decision lays out three criteria for liability under a failure to train claim. First, there
must be a constitutional violation. Next, there must have been some degree of inadequate
training. Finally, there must be a causal connection between these two factors. Barring any one
of these circumstances, the municipality may be immune from Section 1983 claims. This
decision has interesting ramifications for our discussion of use of force training. For the purposes
of the argument I will eschew discussion of the first criterion, simply conceding that in cases of
clearly excessive force, there is a constitutional violation. The second criterion is more
interesting. Section 1983 demands that each defendant must have, through his or her own action,
violated the defendant’s constitutional rights in order to be held accountable. Thus, supervisors
cannot be held accountable for the actions of their charges, a form of vicarious liability.135 In
order to prove the liability of a supervisor, it must be shown that the actions of the supervisor’s
subordinate deprived the plaintiff of his or her Constitutional rights and that the defendant clearly
directed the subordinate to take the actions that deprived these rights.136 In the case of use of
force incidents, the plaintiff must prove that there was some departmental policy (or lack thereof)
that caused the constitutional violation. The obvious problem is that seemingly any injury or
Constitutional violation caused by an officer could have been prevented with more training. The
Court recognized this, noting “Such a claim could be made about almost any encounter resulting
in injury, yet not condemn the adequacy of the program to enable officers to respond properly to
the usual and recurring situations with which they must deal. And plainly, adequately trained
officers occasionally make mistakes; the fact that they do says little about the training program
135
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or the legal basis for holding the city liable.”137 On its face this sets an almost impossibly high
bar for claimants who wish to challenge precinct policy. This was a decision that the Court made
intentionally, lest the courts be bogged down with, “an endless exercise of second guessing
municipal employee training programs… an exercise we believe the Federal courts are ill-suited
to undertake.”138
The discussion of officer training is complicated when one considers the type of
training.139 Consider the 2008 case Kalma v. City of Socorro.140 In this case the court noted that
the police department lacked a use of force training model. This lack of model, compounded
with other training and procedural factors, precluded the court from dismissing charges of
excessive use of force. The court writes, “At the time of the incident at issue, the city had a
formal, written policy permitting its officers to use a chokehold to restrain a suspect. The city did
not, however, have a use of force continuum policy such that officers were required to employ a
step-by-step approach to eliminate resistance or violence. As a result, the city’s formal policy
condoned the use of a chokehold without first considering whether lesser responses would be
preferred.”141 What is interesting is in that same case, the court granted the officers individual
immunity for following the procedure laid forth by their precinct. The municipality was still
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found at fault for improper procedure. Courts consider an officers training and the protocols that
dictate their behavior when considering use of force claims.
In Davis v. Grynkewicz, III, the defendant, an officer accused of excessive force under the
4th, attempted to exclude evidence regarding the ‘force continuum’.142 The Plaintiff insisted that
the force continuum is appropriate “evidence … relevant to determining whether [the officer]
acted reasonably under the circumstances.”143 The court agreed with the plaintiff and admitted
the evidence with the following guidance. “Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a
fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence, and the fact is of consequence
in determining the action. Here, evidence of the types of force available to law enforcement
officers and their training on the subject is relevant to the Graham reasonableness inquiry.
Specifically, such information is likely to assist the jury in determining how a reasonable officer
might have acted in the situation at issue. The Constitution does not require a police officer to
use the least harmful type of force available; only that the force actually used be objectively
reasonable in light of the threat to officers and others. Nevertheless, the force continuum and
testimony about the types of force that officers are trained to use, are instructive to a jury’s
understanding of what is a reasonable response.”144
Importantly, the court is not arguing that a use of force continuum is necessary, or that,
“an officers compliance with, or violation of departmental policy is conclusive as to whether or
not the suspect’s 4th Amendment rights were violated” but, “in considering whether an officers
actions are ‘objectively reasonable’, all of the facts and circumstances confronting the office may
be considered.”145
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I argue that this decision should point precincts towards a use of force continuum model.
The use of force continuum model, structured with the needs of the precinct and municipal in
mind, but following a national standard, could solve issues posed by City of Canton. A use of
force continuum model, properly formulated, would significantly reduce the likelihood that a
claimant could demonstrate improper training in use of force incidents. More importantly, if a
claimant is able to demonstrate that the particular use of force continuum is inadequate, then the
precinct could take immediate concrete measures to retrain the officer and reformat the
continuum. Understanding that City of Canton would preclude most claims of inadequate
training from reaching the courts, combined with this imperative to train and implement use of
force continuum, would give gravity to those cases that do make it to court. A precinct that truly
is ignorant of the right of those it is sworn to protect should be punished.

Objective Reasonableness in Action

Let’s consider People v. Atkinson146 to understand how an objective reasonableness inquiry
plays out. New York courts issued a warrant for the arrest of Karseen Atkinson for violation of
the terms of his parole. Atkinson, previously convicted for trafficking drugs and possession of an
illegal firearm, was suspected of again engaging in drug trade. Officers found Atkinson riding in
a friend’s vehicle and attempted to arrest him. Atkinson resisted arrest and would not speak with
the officers. One officer forcibly placed Atkinson on the ground and pinned him there while a
second officer attempted to restrain him. Atkinson fought against the officers. The officers were
unsure of Atkinson’s intentions and believed that he might be hiding a weapon, so they TASED
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him. While Atkinson was being TASED, an officer saw a small baggie containing white powder
in Atkinson’s mouth. The officers ordered Atkinson to spit out the baggie, threatening to TASE
him again. Atkinson was TASED a second time, yet he still refused to drop the baggie. Both
officers simultaneously TASED Atkinson a third time, apparently unaware of each other’s
intentions. Atkinson finally dropped the baggie, which contained cocaine. Immediately after, the
officers found a second baggie of cocaine in his pants and an unregistered firearm in the
vehicle.147
Atkinson’s defense moved to suppress the cocaine obtained from his mouth during the
excessive TASING, but the court denied the motion. Atkinson was convicted of criminal
possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a weapon in
the fourth degree. Atkinson appealed. The appellate court found that the local court erred in
refusing to suppress the cocaine seized from his mouth. After a lengthy suppression hearing the
motion was denied and Atkinson appealed again. The defense claimed the evidence was the
result of the officer’s use of excessive force and thus ought to be impermissible under 4th
Amendment protections.
The court did not find the use of force to be unreasonable. Though the officers
unsuccessfully petitioned for Section 1983 immunity, they were not found guilty of violating the
4th. According to the court, the objective reasonableness standard of the 4th amendment requires
considering the “totality of the circumstances” to determine what level of force is permissible.148
The court noted the engagement “was a highly charged situation, where [the] defendant refused
to comply with any orders.”149 The officers were aware of Atkinson’s criminal record and that
he had "absconded from parole and was allegedly trafficking drugs.” Atkinson was actively and
147
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violently resisting arrest. Additionally, the officers saw what they believed to be, and what was,
narcotics in Atkinson's mouth. Finally, the entire incident occurred in less than one minute. The
court also considered Atkinson’s safety as ingesting cocaine would likely have deleterious
effects on his health. The totality of these circumstances led the court to believe a reasonable
officer at the time would have acted similarly, or at least would not find the actions
objectionable.

Proportionality Standard – An Alternative
Vicki C. Jackson offers an alternative to 4th Amendment Objective Reasonableness. In
her 2015 work “Constitutional Law in the Age of Proportionality,” she argues for the
reassessment of US constitutional law in favor of a proportionality standard.150 In order to make
her argument about proportionality standards, Jackson considers how these standards are used in
other nations, specifically Canada and Israel. A proportionality standard, Jackson explains, is a
“general principle of constitutional law… [that] requires government intrusions on freedoms be
justified, that greater intrusions have stronger justifications, and that punishments reflect the
relative severity of the offense.”151 In general, proportionality standards provide guidance for
officials and courts to set boundaries to some otherwise authorized government actions. This is
not a totally foreign concept within the American judicial system. Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence as well as levels of scrutiny doctrines embody the idea that harms by the
government should be justified by “loftier standards.”152
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The Canadian proportionality standard is one of the most comprehensive and successful
standards, and thus is used as a reference point for how an American proportionality standard
could function. In the Canadian context, the proportionality inquiry begins with a review of the
scope of the right that is in question. How is that right protected and by what statute or
constitutional protection? Next the court considers the authority of the action that violated said
right. This is a three-step inquiry which assesses the (a) rationality; (b) minimal impairment; and
(c) proportionality of the action.153 On its face this may seem like a balance test – the weighing
of individual rights against some societal or governmental interest. 154 However, a balance test,
even by its name alone, views the government interest and individual right as things that can be
measured against one another. There may be instances where a government interest outweighs a
right, simply for its sheer importance. A proportionality test does not hold governmental interests
equal to individual rights from the start. This is the idea behind “proportionality as such”, an
Israeli term that has been co-opted by the Canadian system. “Proportionality as such” begins
from a perspective that individual rights are sacrosanct and the government has the burden of
justification of the intrusion.155 In this way a proportionality standard tips the scales of justice in
favor of the individual. Courts applying proportionality standards must next ask whether the
intrusions on these extremely valuable, though not quite absolute, rights are proportional to the
benefits provided by achievement of the government interests at stake in a particular area of law
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and policy. Only if the magnitude of the intrusion on rights is less than the benefits provided
(including harms avoided) can a law or policy survive proportionality review.
Jackson addresses the applicability of the proportionality standard to 4th Amendment use
of force jurisprudence by considering Atwater v. City of Lago Vista.156 Here the courts
considered the arrest of a young mother (Atwater) for a non-jailable traffic offense. Following a
verbal altercation, officers refused Atwater’s request to turn her children over to her neighbor’s
care. Atwater was arrested and brought to the police station. There she was promptly released
with a $50 fine, though her vehicle was impounded.157 Atwater sued, claiming that the officers’
conduct was gratuitous and humiliating. The case was brought to the Supreme Court, where the
majority opinion noted that, ““if we were to derive a rule exclusively to address the uncontested
facts of this case, Atwater might well prevail.”158 Unfortunately for Atwater, this is not how the
Court functions in appellate cases. The role of the Supreme Court in reviewing Atwater was not
to fact-find. That is the role of the lower courts. The Supreme Court granted cert to determine if
the 4th Amendment limits an officer’s ability to arrest an individual without warrant for a minor
offense. In a split decision the Court found that yes, generally speaking, officers can effect
warrantless arrests for minor offenses.
Jackson sees this decision as an illustration of the failure of the American court system.
As a young mother of two and a member of the community of Lago Vista, Atwater would have
little incentive to flee the scene. Immediate arrest with the threat of incarceration seems
excessive. The officers should certainly have allowed Atwater to turn her children over to the
care of her neighbor before they enacted any arrest. However, they should not have arrested
Atwater in the first place. Jackson contends that had the Court followed a proportionality review
156
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of the case (as in the Canadian system) they would have first considered whether Atwater’s
interests lie within the scope of the 4th Amendment (they do). Next they would have determined
if the officer’s actions were rational and minimally impairing. Certainly they were not: persons
are not ordinarily arrested for non-jailable traffic offenses. There is little doubt that Atwater
upset the officers with her words, and the officers effected the arrest as a demonstration of their
control. Finally, on a proportionality approach the court would consider “proportionality as
such,” allowing the government (in this case the officers) to try to justify their seizure of
Atwater.159 If their only rationale was that she was rude to them, clearly their infringement on
her liberties was not proportional to the government’s interests. But the Court’s reliance on a
reasonableness standard reached a different result.
Effectively, Jackson argues that 4th Amendment Objective Reasonableness standard does
not reflect the spirit of “Constitutional Justice.”160 If you consider the text of the 4th amendment,
a premium is placed on the feeling of security and safety of the individual. Atwater and her
children were done a great disservice by the officers. Jackson’s argument for a proportionality
standard is indeed compelling. It seems that if the court were to adopt a proportionality standard
fashioned in the way that Jackson describes, there would be a disincentive for officers to use
excessive force.

Objective Reasonableness: A Superior Standard

Therein lies the problem with adopting a proportionality standard for excessive force
claims under the 4th Amendment. The Court in Atwater noted, “a responsible 4th Amendment
159
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balance is not well served by standards requiring sensitive, case-by-case determinations of
government need, lest every discretionary judgment in the field be converted into an occasion for
constitutional review.”161 If a proportionality standard which considers “proportionality as such”
was adopted, there would not just be a disincentive to use excessive force, there might well be a
disincentive to use force in any capacity. Removing the 4th Amendment Objective
Reasonableness test and replacing it with a standard that is preferential to individual rights over
the government places officers in a very precarious situation. Officers are tasked with enforcing
the law, and part of this enforcement is the use of force. Section 1983 allows for individuals to
sue officers if their action violates an established right – not the least of which would be the
freedom from unreasonable seizure. Without the 4th Amendment objective reasonableness test,
officers will only have their defense of qualified immunity to defend against suit. Recall that
qualified immunity has its own objective reasonableness test. However, this test is one that
requires the court to assess what a reasonable officer would have known about the right that was
violated, not how he or she would have acted. Law Enforcement officials work closely along 4th
Amendment guidelines in the execution of their job. They are aware that the 4th Amendment
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. They also, through their training and experience,
can be shown to know that use of force is a seizure of a person. Moving away from the Objective
Reasonableness test as established in Graham opens officers to an unprecedented level of
scrutiny.162
Jackson raises important questions regarding the current state of the American legal
system. I do not deny that in the context of 1st Amendment rights, a proportionality standard

161

Atwater, 347.
Additionally, the proportionality standard calls for officers to use the minimum amount of force. As noted in
Graham, minimum invasiveness is not a requirement for the purpose of an objective reasonableness test.
162

52

would be an incredible boon for individual rights.163 However law enforcement officials are
given a certain discretion from the court for a reason – the nature of their job is such that they
may inadvertently violate rights. The Objective Reasonableness standard of the 4th Amendment
allows courts to consider what a reasonable officer would have done in the same context. This is
the appropriate measure for assessing rights violations. If a reasonable officer would do the same
thing in context, then the action taken (which lead to the individual right intrusion) must be
permitted.

163

Especially in an age of increased surveillance.

53

Conclusion
The use of force by officers is a necessarily contentious fact of American life that cannot
be solved by academic research alone. Since its inception, law enforcement has existed in a
precarious dichotomy in the public consciousness – officers are both trusted to protect the law
and feared for their potential use force to break the law. Though precincts have adopted a
number of internal policies to prevent abuse of power, private citizens can always hold officers
accountable for their actions via Section 1983 suits. Objective Reasonableness, as formulated by
the Graham Court, is an effective standard to guide jurors in determining if an individual’s rights
have been unreasonably violated. This test calls for jurors to consider if a reasonable officer in
the same context would behave similarly. This is assuming, of course, that the suit survives a
qualified immunity claim, which carries its own reasonableness test.
Whether it is possible to craft a perfectly comprehensive training regime or constitutional
test means nothing if officers are unwilling or unable to follow these guidelines. However, this is
not to say that officer training or constitutional standards have no value. Recent years have seen
precincts turn away from the use of force as a training tool. This was in error. The use of force
continuum will continue to help officers in the field navigate their (usually event-less)
interactions with the public. Thus, precincts should take heed and incorporate this tool alongside
their new amendment based training. The continuum will help the public hold officers
accountable when the actions taken are objectively un-reasonable. This can help shift the balance
away from distrusting the police to trusting that police are well trained to act appropriately, and
trusting that the courts are well equipped to punish bad actors.
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APPENDIX
Table 1

*The number of “active” cases declines with each action. The percentage figures refer to the number of cases
that have not been resolve, either by release or by taking the suspect into custody.
Source: Alpert, Geoffrey P., and Roger G. Dunham. Understanding Police Use of Force: Officers, Suspects, and
Reciprocity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, 89.
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Table 2

*The number of “active” cases declines with each action. The percentage figures refer to the number of cases
that have not been resolve, either by release or by taking the suspect into custody.
Source: Alpert, Geoffrey P., and Roger G. Dunham. Understanding Police Use of Force: Officers, Suspects, and
Reciprocity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, 89.
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Figure A
Linear Use of Force Continuum

Source: “Use of Force Continuum” Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Dept. of Homeland Security (2000).
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Figure B
Circular Use of Force Continuum

Source: “Use of Force Continuum,” National Institute of Justice (2000).
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Figure C
This is a sample of the FLETC post-incident report debriefing form
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Source: “Use of Force Incident Report” Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Dept. of Homeland Security
(2014).
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